This paper examines bank credit growth in emerging markets before, during, and after the 2008-09 financial crisis using bank-level data, focusing on the role of bank ownership. Credit growth by foreign banks lagged behind that of domestic banks in 2009 in Asia, and in 2010 in Latin America and emerging Europe. State-owned banks instead played a counter-cyclical role during the crisis in particular in Latin America and emerging Europe, and credit by stateowned banks also grew faster than that of private banks after the crisis in Latin America. Expansionary monetary policy on average led to higher credit growth. Banks in Latin America and Asia that relied more on retail funding had higher credit growth, in particular during the crisis. Better-capitalized banks and banks with more liquid assets also had faster credit growth. Finally, banks in countries with stronger banking regulation had higher credit growth during the crisis. JEL Classification Numbers: G01, G21
I. Introduction
This paper uses bank-level data to study credit growth by deposit-taking banks before, during, and after the global financial crisis, with particular attention to the role of bank ownership. The ownership structure of banking sectors in developing and emerging market countries have changed substantially since late 1990s. Between 1999 and 2009, the share of bank assets held by foreign banks in developing countries rose from 26 to 46 percent, while government bank ownership declined from 28 to 19 percent (Cull and Peria, 2012) .
2 During the 2008-09 crisis, while bank credit growth dropped significantly, there were differences in bank behavior depending on bank ownership, which is the focus of this study, although we also examined other factors affecting bank lending.
There is a rich literature relating bank behavior to ownership. Foreign banks are found to help diversify risks (Allen et al., 2011) and increase competition and improve efficiency (Detragiache and Gupta, 2006; Taboada, 2011; Hasan and Xie, 2012) . Foreign banks often played a stabilizing role during past local emerging market crises by providing more capital and credit (de Haas and van Lelyveld, 2006, 2010; Dages et al., 2000; Crystal et al., 2001 Crystal et al., , 2002 Arena et al., 2007; Claessens and van Horen, 2013) . On the other hand, foreign bank participation can expose unhedged borrowers to foreign exchange risk and the local banking system to foreign shocks (Peek and Rosengren, 1997, 2000; Avdjiev et al. 2012) . During the 2008-09 financial crisis which originated from advanced economies, foreign banks might have helped transmit the crisis from parent countries to local markets through cutting credit supply (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; Popov and Udell, 2012; Schnabl, 2012) .
There is evidence that state-owned banks hinder financial development (La Porta et al., 2002; Barth et al., 2004) . Lending by state banks are often politically motivated Brown and Dinc, 2005) , and state banks are usually less efficient (Micco et al., 2007; Berger et al., 2009 ). State-owned banks can also play a positive role in some aspects. Andrianova et al. (2009) found that state banks could foster growth if they are managed with sound and transparent practice. In addition, during financial crises, state banks often played a countercyclical role by better maintaining credit growth (Micco and Panizza, 2006; De Haas and van Lelyveld, 2011; Bertay et al., 2012 ). This paper is most closely related to Bakker et al. (2013) and Cull and Peria (2012) . Bakker et al. (2013) focused on European emerging markets and found that foreign ownership was associated with higher credit growth before the crisis, but this positive effect declined since 2008. Their study did not address the role of state banks. Cull and Peria (2012) found that in European emerging markets, lending by foreign banks fell more than that of domestic private 2 Foreign bank participation in developing countries has been driven by multiple factors including following home country customers, profit seeking, and low entry barriers (Cull and Peria, 2010; Detragiache et al., 2008). banks during the crisis, and government-owned banks did not act counter-cyclically, but the opposite was true in Latin America.
Compared to these studies, our paper includes Asian emerging markets 3 and we also investigated bank credit growth after the global financial crisis. In addition, we analyzed the impact of monetary policy and banking regulation on credit growth, also using bank-level data. Studies on these subjects have mostly used aggregate data and findings are inclusive. A number of studies (Aisen and Franken, 2010; Bhaumik et al., 2011) identified a link between looser monetary policy and faster credit growth, but Bloxham et al. (2011) found no such link. Banking regulation and supervision were found to be important for credit growth in earlier studies (Hilbers et al., 2005) . However, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) found that banking regulation was generally uncorrelated with the performance of banks during the crisis.
We found that while banks in all three regions experienced a sharp decline in credit growth during the crisis, the behavior of foreign banks and state-owned banks differed, and there are also differences across regions. Lending by foreign banks in Asia fell more than that of domestic banks in 2009 (after controlling for other factors affecting credit growth), but not so in Latin America and emerging Europe. However, in Latin America and Europe, foreign banks' credit growth has lagged behind that of domestic banks in 2010. In contrast, state banks played a counter-cyclical role during the crisis in Latin America and emerging Europe (also some evidence in Asia), and credit by state banks also grew faster than that of private banks after the crisis in Latin America. We further found that foreign parent banks' characteristics affected the credit growth of their subsidiaries.
Expansionary monetary policy on average led to higher credit growth. Better-capitalized banks, and banks with more liquid assets and relied more on retail funding had faster credit growth. In addition, banks in countries with better banking regulation experienced higher credit growth during the crisis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our empirical specification. Section III discusses the data and stylized facts. Section IV presents the empirical results, and Section V provides some concluding remarks.
II. Empirical Methodology
We conduct the analysis for the three regions separately for a cross-regional comparison. Annual individual bank credit growth over is modeled with the following panel specification (similar to Cull and Peria, 2012) : where is the annual credit growth, in U.S. dollars, for bank i in country j in year t. Banks lend in both local and foreign currencies. Following the common practice (e.g., Cull and Peria, 2012; Bakker, 2013) , we used credit in U.S. dollars but included exchange rate depreciation (for the current period) as an explanatory variable to control for the effect of exchange rate movements. 4 Foreign and State are dummy variables take value of one for foreign and state-owned banks, respectively. Year2008-Year2011 are year dummies. … is a vector of country characteristics including aggregate demand (lagged GDP growth), monetary policy rate (lagged), and banking regulation measure at the beginning of the sample period (2003) . These variables only vary at the country level.
is a vector of bank-specific characteristics commonly included in studies of credit growth. These include bank size (log of total bank assets), capitalization (equity-to-loan ratio), liquidity condition (liquid assets/total assets), profitability (return on assets), and funding stability (retail deposits/total liability). We used lagged variables to help control for endogeneity. , , and μ are vectors representing country fixed effects, country-year dummies, and bank fixed effects, respectively, although they are not necessarily included in the same regression. Macro variables such as GDP growth and exchange rate will be dropped automatically when country-year fixed effects are included, since they do not have countryyear variations. In some specifications we also included the characteristics of foreign parent banks including cost-to-income ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, and equity-to-asset ratio. In addition, we included the credit default swap (CDS) of the parent bank's country.
The interactions of the foreign and state dummies with the 2008-11 year dummies are also included. The coefficients of foreign and state dummies by themselves would represent the difference in credit growth of foreign and state banks compared with that of domestic private banks prior to the crisis (2004 to 2007), after controlling for other factors that affect bank credit. The effect of being a foreign bank vs. domestic private banks in 2008, e.g., will be captured by the sum of the foreign dummy and the interaction of the foreign bank dummy and the 2008 year dummy. The difference of the lending behavior by a state bank in 2008 vs. before the crisis would be captured by the sum of the 2008 year dummy and the interaction of the state bank dummy and the 2008 year dummy. The interactions of the year dummies with country-and bank-specific variables are also included in some specifications to identify any specific effects of these variables during and after the crisis. Most of these additional interactions are not statistically significant and are not reported.
III. Data and stylized facts
The bank-level data, including bank ownership data, are from Bankscope, produced by Bureau Van Dijk, which contains comprehensive information on individual banks' financial statement.
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Our study covers more than 900 banks in 24 emerging market countries in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru), Eastern and Central Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Turkey), and Asia (China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam). GDP and exchange rate data are from the IMF's International Financial Statistics database. Monetary policy rates are from Haver Analytics.
To minimize the impact from outliers, we dropped the observations of the top 3 percent credit growth (these observations are 5 times standard deviations above the mean), and winsorized all continuous variables at the 1 percent level. Various other attempts to exclude outliers yield broadly similar results. Additional data adjustments follow Thibaut and Mathias (2012), which are widely used when dealing with Bankscope data (e.g., controlling for the difference between fiscal year and calendar year). The final sample includes 274 banks with 1452 observations for Latin America, 251 banks with 1303 observations for Eastern and Central Europe, and 379 banks with 2068 observations for emerging Asia.
A bank is classified as foreign if 50 percent or more shares are owned by nonresidents. If a bank is owned by more than one foreign banks, its parent bank is identified as the largest foreign shareholder. Similarly, a bank is considered a state-owned bank if the government owns 50 percent or more shares. As of 2008, foreign banks in Latin America controlled one third of banking system assets, compared with more than 60 percent in Eastern and Central Europe, and about one quarter in Asia (Table 1 ). The corresponding shares for state-owned banks are 16 percent, 7 percent, and 24 percent, respectively.
In terms of credit growth, banks in emerging Europe were hardest hit by the crisis, where average credit growth has declined from a peak of 42 percent in 2007 to a nadir of 5 percent in 2009 (Table 2) . Credit growth recovered to 12 percent in 2011, but was still well below its pre-crisis levels. The impact of the crisis was also the largest in 2009 in Latin America, where average credit growth declined to 13 percent from 31 percent in 2007. The revival of credit has been faster in Latin America than in Europe, where credit growth rebounded to [22] [23] [24] [25] 
IV. Regression results

A. Total loans
The reporting template is the same for results for all three regions. Column (1) controls for country fixed effects. Column (2) includes country-year fixed effects, where variables such as GDP growth, exchange rate depreciation, and the year dummies will be dropped. Columns (3)-(6) control for bank fixed effects, which we view as a more robust specification. Since there is no change in state bank ownership (the state banks in the sample have always been state banks), the state bank dummy will be dropped when the bank fixed effects are included. In contrast, about 30 percent of the foreign banks have had ownership changes over the sample period. Column (4) also controls for country-year fixed effects. Finally, Columns (5) and (6) have the same specification as Columns (3) and (4), respectively, but also included the interactions of bank characteristics with year dummies. Most of these additional interaction terms are insignificant and are not reported to save space. Note: "F" represents foreign banks, "S" represents state-owned banks, and "DP" represents domestic private banks. * indicates that comparing to domestically private owned banks, the mean of the variable is 5% significantly different. Table 4a reports the regression results for bank credit growth in Latin America. The foreign bank dummy by itself is mostly insignificant, except in the specification with country-year dummies, where it is negative and significant at the 5 percent level. The interaction of the foreign bank dummy and the 2008 year dummy is positive and significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications, pointing to higher credit growth by foreign banks in 2008 (by about 15 percentage points based on Column (4)). In contrast, the credit growth of foreign banks was lower than that of domestic private banks in 2010 (by 19 percentage points according to Column (4)). This points to a possible link to the 2010 European financial crisis given the dominance of Spanish banks in Latin America, which will be discussed further below.
A.1. Latin America
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Finally, the interaction of the foreign bank dummy with the 2011 year dummy is mostly positive although only significant in Columns (1) and (2), providing some evidence of faster post-crisis credit recovery for foreign banks.
The state bank dummy, which is only included in columns (1) and (2), is negative and significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that the credit growth of state banks usually lagged behind that of domestic private banks before the crisis (by about 12 percentage points). The interactions of the state bank dummy and the 2008 and 2009 year dummies are however positive and significant, indicating that state banks played a counter-cyclical role during the crisis by providing additional credit than what they would have done in a "normal" year. The evidence is particularly strong for 2008, where the coefficient is large (about 30 percentage points) and significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications. There is also evidence that state banks played an active role in providing credit in 2011.
The finding that state banks have played a countercyclical role during the crisis does not address the question of loan quality. The nonperforming-loan ratio for state banks did increase a bit from 3.6 percent in 2009 to 4.5 percent in 2010, but it is still lower than the level in 2008, and it declined in 2011.
The higher credit growth by state banks during the crisis does not seem to be the result of mergers and acquisitions by state banks over private banks. We have excluded observations with the top 3 percent credit growth, which would help exclude very large credit growth due (5) and (6) also include interactions of bank-specific variables and the 2008-11 year dummies, most of them not reported to save space. to mergers and acquisitions. As a robustness check we also excluded observations with top 5 percent credit growth and the results (not reported) are broadly similar. The higher credit growth by state banks was also not driven by customers transferring deposits from private to state banks-the decline in deposit growth during 2008/09 for state banks is comparable to that of non-state banks.
Control variables are of expected sign. Strong GDP growth led to higher credit growth. Banks with higher capital and profitability, more liquid assets, and relying more on retail funding on average had higher credit growth. The interactions of these variables with year dummies are mostly insignificant, but the interaction of the customer deposits/total liability ratio with the 2009 and 2010 dummies are positive and significant (at the 5 and 10 percent respectively), suggesting that retail deposits were particularly important in funding credit in Latin America during and after the crisis. Finally, larger banks on average had lower credit growth. Bakker et al. (2013) and Cull and Peria (2012) . The difference seems to result from the difference in sample countries, where Bakker et al. (2013) included countries that are typically not considered emerging markets, 7 and compared with Cull and Peria (2012) we included Baltic countries and Turkey.
A.2. Eastern and Central Europe
Foreign banks in emerging Europe traditionally relied on cross-border wholesale funding, on which the global financial crisis had a major impact. On the other hand, reflecting banks' frustration with the "centralized" funding model since the onset of the crisis, since late 2008 they have been rebalancing their funding toward local sources (IMF, 2013) . The Vienna Initiative which brought together key western parent bank groups, home and host-country authorities, and multilateral organizations also helped alleviate the impact of the crisis on foreign banks' lending.
The state bank dummy by itself is negative (specifications (1) and (2)) but insignificant. The interaction of the state bank dummy and the 2009 year dummy is positive and significant in most specifications, suggesting a countercyclical role by state banks during the crisis. The results for other control variables are in line with expectations, although some are insignificant.
A.3. Emerging Asia
7 Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Column (4) ). There is some evidence that state banks played a counter-cyclical role in 2009. The results for other control variables are mostly as expected, although return on assets, while positive, is insignificant. There is also evidence that strong bank capital and reliance on retail deposits were particularly important for Asian banks in underpinning credit growth during the crisis (2009).
B. Corporate and consumer loans
The sample size for corporate and consumer loans is markedly smaller, therefore the results (Table 5) are not strictly comparable with those for total loans. In Latin America, the growth of corporate loans for foreign banks has lagged behind that of private domestic banks both before the crisis and in 2009/10. State banks played a strong counter-cyclical role in 2008.
In Eastern and Central Europe, while there is evidence that foreign banks reduced their lending to corporate more than domestic private banks did during 2010-11, there is little evidence of state banks playing a counter-cyclical role during the crisis. In emerging Asia, the sample is reduced to only 16 percent of the sample for total loans, and the foreign bank dummy is dropped as there is no ownership change in the sample. Foreign banks actually had higher corporate credit growth in 2010, and there is no evidence of state banks playing a counter-cyclical role during the crisis. Table 6 reports the results for consumer loans. 8 In Latin America, the decline in foreign banks' consumer credit was particularly severe in 2009, and there is some evidence of state banks playing a counter-cyclical role in 2008. In emerging Europe, the growth of consumer loans for foreign banks was not significantly different from that of domestic private banks, but state-owned banks played a counter-cyclical role in 2008. In emerging Asia, the sample is again much smaller. Foreign banks had more lending contraction compared with domestic private banks during and after the crisis, but there seemed to be no specific efforts by state banks to support consumer lending during the crisis.
In summary, the counter-cyclical role played by state banks during the crisis was mostly on corporate loans in Latin America, but seemed to be mostly on consumer loans in emerging Europe.
C. Impact of parent banks on credit growth
This section investigates whether parent banks' characteristics have any impact on the credit (5) and (6) also include interactions of bank-specific variables and the 2008-11 year dummies, most of them not reported to save space. (3), (6), and (9) also include interactions of bank-specific variables and the 2008-11 year dummies, not reported to save space.
Latin America
Eastern and Central Europe Asia (6), and (9) also include interactions of bank-specific variables and the 2008-11 year dummies, not reported to save space.
Eastern and Central Europe Asia growth of their subsidiaries (or branches). Following Bakker et al. (2013) , we include measures of parent banks' funding costs (cost-to-income ratio), reliance on deposit funding (loan-to-deposit ratio), and capitalization (equity-to-asset ratio). The origin of the parent bank could also be important, as the home countries (and the banks there) were affected by the global financial crisis in different degrees. Parent banks in countries more severely affected by the crisis might have reallocated more funding from their foreign subsidiaries, thus reducing available funds and credit growth in those countries. We therefore also included the CDS for the 10-year government bond of the parent bank's country.
Parent bank origin exhibits substantial heterogeneities across regions (Table 7) . At the onset of the global financial crisis, Spanish banks accounted for 63 percent of foreign banks in Latin America (by assets), Western European banks accounted for 78 percent of foreign banks in emerging Europe, and banks from other Asian countries (mainly Japan and Singapore) accounted for 40 percent of foreign banks in emerging Asia. Table 8 reports the regression results for foreign banks only, controlling for country/regional origins. "Spain" and "Euro" are dummy variables for Spanish and Western European banks, and "Asia" is a dummy for banks from other Asian countries. The dummy variables are dropped in the specification with bank-fixed effects since the sample is limited to foreign banks. In Latin America, Spanish banks had higher credit growth than other foreign banks prior to the crisis, but had significantly lower credit growth in 2008. In emerging Europe, there was no significant difference in credit growth between Western European banks and other foreign banks, but foreign banks with higher home country CDS had lower credit growth. In Asia, there is some evidence that foreign banks from the other Asian countries had larger credit decline in 2008, and foreign banks whose parent bank had higher funding costs on average had lower credit growth. Table 9 reports the results using credit growth measured in constant local currency. The results are pretty close to the benchmark results. Limiting the sample to banks without any Table 4a ) are also included, but not reported to save space.
D. Robustness checks
Country fixed effect Y N N Y N N Y N N Country-year fixed effect N Y N N Y N N Y N Bank fixed effect N N Y N N Y N N Y
Latin America
Eastern and Central Europe Asia ownership changes also yields similar results (Table 10) . Using only the balanced panel data or dropping braches (accounting for 7 percent of foreign bank observations) also yield broadly similar results (not reported to save space).
Credit growth may be path-dependent, or affected by the amount of existing nonperforming loans. Table 11 reports the results controlling for these two additional factors. Despite a smaller sample size, the results are broadly similar to the benchmark results. For banks in emerging Europe, there is some evidence of convergence in credit growth, where banks with higher credit growth in recent years had lower credit growth. Higher nonperforming ratio also led to slower credit growth for Latin America banks.
E. Impact of monetary policy and banking regulation on credit growth
We also investigate how monetary policy and banking regulation affect credit growth (Table  12) . For monetary policy we use monetary policy rate (one-year lag). Expansionary monetary policy on average resulted in higher credit lending growth. For Latin American and Asian banks the impact of monetary policy rate on credit growth was larger in 2011. For Emerging European countries, the interaction of policy rate and the 2010/11 dummies are of the "wrong" sign, which is probably an indication of an endogeneity problem. The results for the foreign and state banks dummies are broadly in line with baseline results.
Finally, Table 13 reports the impact of banking regulation on credit growth. We use two dummy variable measures of banking regulation: the supervision indicator dummy and the monitoring indicator dummy. These are constructed following Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) using the bank regulation and supervision database compiled by Barth et al. (2007) . The supervision indicator takes a value of one if there are multiple independent supervisors for banks and zero otherwise. The monitoring index takes a value of one if (1) the top ten banks in the country are all rated by international rating agencies, (2) off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the public, (3) banks must disclose risk management procedures to the public, and (4) subordinated debt is required as part of regulatory capital. In both measures a value of one for the dummy variable suggests better banking regulation.
To avoid the potential endogeneity problem, we used the banking regulation measure for 2003, one year prior to our sample period. Latin American countries all have the same rating, and Vietnam is the only Asian country having a different rating with other Asian countries. We therefore only conducted the analysis for emerging European countries. The evidence, when the supervision indicator is used, suggests that on average banks in countries with better banking regulation prior to the crisis had higher credit growth during the crisis. 
V. Concluding remarks
This paper examines bank credit growth in emerging markets before, during, and after the 2008-09 financial crisis using bank-level data, focusing on the role of bank ownership. While credit growth declined during the crisis in all regions, there are heterogeneities across regions and across bank types. Lending by foreign banks in Asia fell by more than that of domestic private banks in 2009, while in Latin America and emerging Europe foreign banks' credit growth lagged behind that of domestic banks in 2010. In contrast, state banks played a counter-cyclical role during the crisis in Latin America and Europe (and some evidence in Asia as well), and credit by state banks also grew faster than that of private banks after the crisis in Latin America.
Expansionary monetary policy on average led to higher credit growth. Better-capitalized banks and banks that were more profitable, with more liquid assets, and relying more on retail deposits in funding also had faster credit growth. There is also evidence pointing to the particular importance of retail funding in underpinning credit growth in Latin America and Asia during the crisis. In addition, banks in emerging Europe with better banking regulation had faster credit growth during the crisis. Characteristics of the parent bank such as the costto-income ratio and the customer deposit-to-loan ratio also had an impact on the lending of their subsidiaries, although the effect is not consistently significant across regions. Foreign banks' country of origin also matters: Spanish banks in Latin America were particularly hard hit during the crisis, and foreign banks in emerging Europe with a higher CDS for their home country had lower credit growth.
The results suggest that a diversification of foreign bank ownership from different countries may help diversify risks by reducing the impact of idiosyncratic shocks from one particular country. In addition, maintaining a decent market share of state-owned banks in the banking system could provide a form of insurance in the downturn as witnessed by the countercyclical role the state-owned banks played during the global financial crisis.
